Th e interception of containers loaded with pump action guns recently by Nigeria Customs Service brings to the fore once more the implications of smuggling of dangerous weapons to Nigeria’s national security. Th e latest interception is incidentally the fourth of such seizures made this year.
Th ere were previously three similar incidents this year. Preliminary investigations show the same importer is responsible the four cases. It is important to note that these incidents are just the tip of the iceberg as about eighty percent of smuggled weapons reportedly pass undetected. It is important to note that on the spectrum of threat assessment based on gravity and risk potentials, proliferation of dangerous weapons is high on the scale.
Th e Controller General of Nigeria Customs Service, Col. Hameed Ali, Rtd., must therefore be supported urgently to deal with this threat to our national security. Th e country is believed to be a popular destination for dangerous weapons for several reasons. Th e most prominent is poor border control. Th is is not surprising as the country has about the longest border on the continent. No section of these borders and coastal waters is at the moment monitored electronically and technically.
Th e porous borders are easy to breach by smugglers of dangerous weapons. Th is underscores the importance of deploying other strategies to deal with the issue of smuggling. Th ere is also the problem of weak security and enforcement of laws dealing with illegal possession of dangerous weapons in the country.. Attempts have been made in the past to curtail and mop up dangerous weapons in circulation in the country. Regrettably, this eff ort has not been successful. Other contributory factors are the huge demands for weapons for self protection.
Th e loss of confi dence in the ability of security and law enforcement agencies to provide adequate security to the citizenry compels many to resort to self protection, hence the huge market for guns. Th e situation is compounded by myriad of inter-communal and interreligious fl air ups, as well as, separatist agitations and recently the insurgency in the Northeast. Insecurity and instability, especially those fueled by mistrust, usually provide reasons for acquisition of dangerous weapons.
Th e emergence of militancy in parts of the country is another factor that has hugely contributed to increase in the volume of dangerous weapons in circulation in parts of the country. What this portend is, National Security is under serious threat as the result of easy access to dangerous weapons, among other things.
Th ere have been observations that violent attacks on communities and places of worship in parts of the country of recent are direct consequences of easy access to dangerous weapons. Similarly, the insurgency in the Northeast from available intelligence is a major cause of infl ow of smuggled weapons into the country, second only to the militancy in the Niger Delta in the last ten years. Some years ago, most of the dangerous weapons in possession of the insurgents were from sources who had connection with death merchants from countries like Libya, Chad and Mali.
Th ere were also substantial quantity of the arms seized from law enforcement personnel and government armouries in the hand of criminally minded people. Armed robbers are known to patronize criminals who seize weapons from security and law enforcement agents. Th ese are the reasons any strategy to curtail illegal arms circulation in the country must include stringent control and checks on the weapons in the possession of security and law enforcement agencies. Th ere are also reports that massive smuggling of dangerous weapons through the coastal waters account for the largest quantum of dangerous weapons in circulation in sections of the country.
Th is development incidentally is not unrelated to the outsourcing of maritime security to some vested interest some years ago and the militancy in the Niger Delta. Th e failure to eff ectively man border points known to be notorious routes for smuggling today represents the weakest link in our national security architecture. Th e point must however be noted that despite eff orts of the agencies charged with border security, eff ective border security control capable of intercepting dangerous weapons and persons whose activities could be inimical to national security remain daunting. It is believed that dangerous weapons and persons of security interest still fi nd their way into the country through the coastal waters and borders in most parts of the country.. Th e point needs be noted that virtually all border areas in the country are today routes for smuggling of dangerous weapons, among other things. Th e truth however is smuggling of dangerous weapons is successful only with the connivance of security agencies at the points of entry and those checking imports. Th is is why any eff orts at successfully checking arms smuggling into the country must include putting stringent checks and supervision in the ports of entry. Hundred percent inspection must also be adopted henceforth if the importation of dangerous items is to be curtailed.
It is also expedient that proper investigations are conducted on the seizures made if the trend is to be stopped. For example, there are intelligence reports that the smuggling of dangerous weapons into the country is intrinsically linked to illicit drug trade. Th is should be looked into. Th e Customs Service must therefore put heads together with the State Security Service and NDLEA to look into these assertions. Other areas that need to be looked at carefully are the likely linkages between the arms interception and recent agitations in parts of the country. Th is is the only way of ruling out the interceptions are not for subversive purposes. Th at is not all, a category of dangerous arms such as the
